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Introduction
Global climate change is bringing about epochal transformation in the Arctic region, most notably through the melting of the polar ice cap. The impact of these changes, and how the global community reacts, may very well be the most important and farthest reaching body of issues humanity has yet faced in this new century. A number of nations bordering the Arctic have made broad strides toward exercising their perceived sovereign rights in the region, and all except the United States have acceded to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); UNCLOS provides an international legal basis for these rights and claims. 1 Similarly, while most Arctic nations have been planning, preparing, and programming resources for many years in anticipation of the Arctic thaw, the United States has been slow to act on any of the substantive steps necessary for the exercise of sovereign rights or the preservation of vital national interests in the region. 2 The United States must move outside the construct of unilateral action in order to preserve its sovereign rights in the Arctic, capitalize on the opportunities available, and safeguard vital national interests in the region. In today's budget-constrained environment and as a Nation at war with higher resource priorities in Iraq and Afghanistan than in the Arctic, it is unrealistic to believe that any significant allocation will be programmed for addressing this issue. 3 Since the United States is too far behind in actions necessary to preserve its vital national interests as compared to the other Arctic countries, the Nation must take the lead to cultivate a new multilateral partnership paradigm in the region.
A new partnership framework is vital to pooling the many capabilities of the Arctic nations and ultimately leveraging these capabilities for the preservation of the United States'
interests. Analysis will show a dearth of unifying military partnership constructs on anything other than a bilateral or trilateral basis, and reveals that search and rescue operations may be the -glue‖ that ultimately binds the Arctic nations' military forces together. While the opportunity for and types of partnerships are expansive, the scope of the recommendations is limited to accession to UNCLOS, sponsorship of a unifying multinational arctic exercise, and establishment of a comprehensive military partnership framework. To this end, background information illustrating the magnitude of the problem is offered followed by a brief review of differing opinions on U.S. partnership, analysis of the actions and preparedness of other Arctic nations, examination of some existing partnership frameworks and opportunities, and concluding recommendations for the U.S. theater-strategic leader in the Arctic.
Background: The United States is Unprepared
The Arctic is the fastest warming region on the planet and scientific models forecast an ice-free summer Arctic sea within 30 years with some predictions as early as 2013. 4 As the Arctic ice cap recedes, expansive virgin areas rich in natural resources and new, commercially
lucrative maritime routes open for exploitation by those nations most prepared to capitalize on these opportunities. The potential for economic gain is enormous as 10 percent of the world's known and an estimated 25 percent of undiscovered hydrocarbon resources exist in the region, 84 percent of which occurs offshore. 5 Transportation of these resources pose high profit potential as well. For example, tanker traffic between northern Russia terminals and Southeast
Asia ports can save $1 million in fuel costs using an Arctic routing instead of the Suez Canal. 6 Those countries with the requisite capability stand to be handsomely rewarded.
An essential resource in the Arctic is a fleet of ships capable of ice breaking operations.
They are essential not only for the maintenance of waterways and ship escort when sea ice is present, but for the additional duties of year-round sovereignty projection, search and rescue, resource protection, and rule of law enforcement; notably, none of the U.S. icebreakers are configured for these additional duties. 12 To catch up with other Arctic nations in ice breaking capability alone, the expenditure would be at least $20 billion taking decades to complete. 13 While the icebreaker issue outlined above is but one of many aspects of the United States' inability to address vital national interests in the Arctic, it is indicative of the magnitude of the problem facing this nation.
With little organic capability in the region, partnership may seem a natural solution to the United
States' Arctic issues with accession to UNCLOS providing the international cooperative basis for further multilateral endeavors. However, there exist a number of differing opinions on partnership and UNCLOS.
Opposing Views of Partnership
There is significant resistance within the U.S. Congress not only against UNCLOS, but also against any multilateral partnerships. A small but influential group of conservative senators ardently block the UNCLOS treaty from ratification; this effective opposition accounts for some 16 years of -consideration‖ on the issue. 14 Their rationale asserts that accession to UNCLOS forfeits too much U.S. sovereignty and that existing customary international law plus a powerful navy already protects national interests. 15 Further arguments claim that UNCLOS will curtail the U.S. Navy's freedom of movement and states the historical precedence of international law preserving the peace in the Arctic need not be altered. 16 21 Also among the tenacious supporters of accession are the U.S. Navy whose leadership stresses that UNCLOS will protect patrol rights in the Arctic and a number of environmental groups who want to advocate on behalf of Arctic fauna and flora. 22 In addition, the oil industry lobby representing Chevron, Exxon-Mobile, and Conoco-Phillips asserts that oil and gas exploration cannot reasonably occur without the legal stability afforded in UNCLOS. 23 In a consequential benefit of accession, United States' extended continental shelf claims could add 100,000 square miles of undersea territory in the Gulf of Mexico and on the east coast plus another 200,000 square miles in the Arctic. 24 Accession acts to strengthen and extend Arctic jurisdiction, open up additional hydrocarbon and mineral resource opportunities, add to the stability of the international Arctic framework, and boost the legal apparatus for curtailing maritime trafficking and piracy. 25 The benefits appear to outweigh the costs as the United States is increasingly moving to a position of strategic disadvantage in shaping Arctic region policy outcomes by failing to ratify UNCLOS. 26 This stands in stark contrast to other
Arctic nations who have all acceded to UNCLOS and are moving swiftly to assert and consolidate interests in the region.
Analysis of Multinational Moves in the Arctic
Only when the ice breaks will you truly know who is your friend and who is your enemy. Northwest Passage, and an initiative to build six to eight ice hardened offshore patrol vessels, the first of which will be delivered in 2014. 32 Presence and visibility in the Arctic have been bolstered by sponsorship of three major sovereignty exercises annually including the joint and combined Operation NANOOK. 33 Incorporating air, land, and maritime forces to demonstrate and exercise operational capability in the Arctic region, the purpose of these exercises is unequivocally -designed to project Canadian sovereignty in the High Arctic.‖ 34 Canada also maintains a staunch position on the sovereignty of the Northwest Passage as internal waters, a claim refuted by the United States who contends these waters are international straits. 35 Similarly, Canada asserts overlapping territorial claims with the United States in the Beaufort Sea and the maritime border between Alaska and Yukon, with Russia in conflicting extended continental shelf claims, and with Denmark over Hans Island in the Nares Strait. 36 With its fleet of 12 existing icebreakers and programmed additions noted above, national-level emphasis on planning, preparedness, and presence, plus the legal basis granted as a signatory to UNCLOS, Canada appears well ahead of the United States in its ability to address vital national interests in the Arctic. 37 Danish extensions into the realm of Arctic issues track along the major subject areas of sovereignty and security, economic interests, and political activism. Denmark's precarious tie as one of the -Arctic Five‖ lies in Greenland, historically a colonial possession whose relationship to the parent Denmark has evolved into the present day status of self-rule. Under self-rule, Greenland is autonomous in many domestic respects but still supported by Denmark in the areas of -defense, foreign policy, sovereignty control, and other authority tasks,‖ providing the parent country broad powers to deal with Arctic issues. 38 Denmark shares competing claims to the hotly contested Lomonosov Ridge with both Canada and Russia, all of which believe the ridge is an extension of their continental shelves and rich in hydrocarbon reserves. 39 In an interesting dichotomy, Denmark and Canada are working together in a joint scientific venture to map their respective continental shelves despite the perceived encroachment by the Canadians into Danish claimed Hans Island waters. 40 In response to sovereignty concerns generated by Canadian and Denmark has attempted to become a more influential political player in addressing international
Arctic issues and appears to be well on the road towards the ability to deal with vital national interests in the region. 45 Norway has capitalized on a concerted national planning and preparation effort driving a number of key successful regional actions in preservation of its -H igh North‖ interests. As the second nation to submit an extended continental shelf claim to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, it was the first such claim to be recognized and approved. 46 This development, combined with skillful bilateral Russian engagement resulting in the resolution of a 40-year old border dispute in the Barents Sea, solidified in international law
Norway's impressive Arctic maritime domain. 47 The country quickly put this success to work by opening up a new oil field in the western Barents Sea ahead of its Russian counterparts. Moscow appears to perceive itself as the leading Arctic power with the most to gain, a perception supported by impressive plans and resources. 60 The country operates the largest icebreaker fleet in the world with 20 ships, seven of which are nuclear powered. 61 Nonetheless, many of these ships are reaching the end of their service lives resulting in significantly reduced ice breaking capability by 2020. 62 However, continued investment in new ice-breaking technology and partnership with the Russian private sector drove the deployment of new -double acting‖ tankers and cargo vessels. These vessels employ -azimuthal pod‖ propulsion with the ability to cruise bow-first in open water for good performance and stern-first in ice conditions using its reinforced ice-breaking aft hull. The newest such vessel was commissioned in 2010
bringing the fleet of the state-owned shipping company, Sovcomflot, up to three, each with a 70,000 ton capacity. 63 Additional capability, in the form of diesel-electric icebreakers is intended to replace that lost as the Soviet-era nuclear fleet ages. 64 ships to provide advance notice of passage and apply for guidance through the route; implied here is also the payment of a fee for services rendered, a sea based toll-way of sorts. 66 In defense and protection of the border and resource areas, Russia continues to bolster military presence and capability in the Arctic. In addition to the Northern Fleet whose naval military capabilities run the full gamut of surface and subsurface operations, Moscow created the Federal Security Service Coastal Boarder Guard. 67 Additional activities in the border and coastal areas include development of control infrastructure and equipment upgrades for the border guard, implementation of an integrated oceanic monitoring system for surface vessels, and a number of equipment and weapons testing and deployment initiatives. 68 Many of these initiatives demonstrate presence and resolve as in the 2007 launch of cruise missiles over the Arctic, additional Northern Fleet exercises in 2008, and the resumption of Arctic aerial and surface patrols not seen since the end of the Cold War. 69 While many of these actions may appear provocative in nature, Russia has also asserted commitment to working within the framework of international law, actively participated in the Arctic Council and other international bodies, and expressed interest and desire for partnership in the region particularly in the area of search and rescue. 70 In the aggregate, Russia emerges as among the most prepared of Arctic nations for the opportunities available and may well be poised to gain early regional commercial and military supremacy with the goal of similar successes in the international political arena. 71 Russian commitment to multilateral venues, along with the demonstrated attitudes of other Arctic nations, presents the opportunity for U.S. partnership in the region.
Opportunities for Partnership
Each of the -Arctic Five‖ participates in a number of multilateral political venues and has expressed interest in partnership to address current and emerging regional issues. The Arctic
Council, one such venue, was formed in 1996 as a high level membership forum to engender collaboration and cooperation on issues in the region; it has no legal authority through charter but has functioned well to promote multinational visibility and study on Arctic issues by all the Arctic states and indigenous peoples. 72 The 2009 report Arctic Maritime Shipping Assessment, a combined effort of a council working group from Canada, Finland, and the United States identified many areas ripe for cooperation including development of hydrographic data and charting, harmonization of regulatory shipping guidelines, and the critical lack of search and rescue (SAR) capability in the region. 73 Russia has taken the lead on SAR within the council for developing an international cooperation plan. With the Obama administration's intent to reset relations with Russia by seeking areas where the two nations can work together, SAR may prove to be a unifying construct mutually beneficial to all the Arctic nations, especially the United States. 74 Initial ground breaking work on the issue occurred in December 2009 in Washington, DC with additional discussions in Moscow the following February under an Arctic Council resolution to develop a SAR agreement; the archetype for a U.S.-Russian effort is coming into being. 75 Regional synchronization of SAR assets would address one of many U.S. critical capability shortfalls who has no Coast Guard bases on the northern coast of Alaska (the nearest of which is 1,000 miles to the south) and whose closest deep water port is in Dutch Harbor, over 800 miles south of the Arctic circle. 76 Another multilateral collaboration was the Danish-led
Ilulissat Initiative which ultimately resulted in the unanimous Ilulissat Declaration. In the declaration, all the -Arctic Five‖ nations affirmed … an extensive legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean … notably, the law of the sea [UNCLOS] provides for important rights and obligations [and] we remain committed to this legal framework … [UNCLOS] provides a solid foundation for responsible management by the five coastal states and other users. We, therefore, see no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal scheme to govern the Arctic Ocean.
[emphasis added]
The significance of the declaration is paramount to cooperation in that UNCLOS provides the international -c ommon rallying point‖ for the Arctic states. 78 Similarly important, by virtue of the unanimous and strong affirmation toward UNCLOS, the declaration effectively delegitimized the notion to administer the Arctic along the lines of an Antarctic-like treaty preserving the notions of sovereignty and resource exploitation in the region. 79 With the United States' participation in these venues, and its support of UNCLOS publicly declared in both, failure to ratify the treaty suggests that U.S. credibility, legitimacy, and hence the ability to build cohesive multilateral partnerships is appreciably degraded. This conclusion is illustrated in Malaysia and Indonesia's refusal to join the Proliferation Security Initiative using the United States refusal to accede to UNCLOS as their main argument. 80 Accession to the treaty appears to be a key first 
Recommendations
Global climate change is a reality which offers opportunities in the Arctic for those nations prepared to capitalize on them. Many nations have moved forward with significant programmatic initiatives designed to extend sovereignty, expand resource and infrastructure bases, and build cooperative relationships in order to preserve and protect their perceived national interests in the region. The United States has lagged dangerously behind other nations in these preparations and is at a strategic crossroad if it wants to influence and shape the Arctic for its benefit. Vital to these preparations is for the United States to exercise a more active and leading role in Arctic policy shaping and to demonstrate credibility to act within the international legal system. To this end, the United States must:
1) Ratify and put into full force the UNCLOS Treaty. This is a key first step to provide the international legal baseline and credibility for further United States' actions in the region. While not essential to partnership, accession nonetheless demonstrates U.S. willingness to operate in a cooperative vice unilateral manner within the international arena. Through UNCLOS, the United
States will gain international recognition of exclusive rights over an additional 300,000 square miles of undersea territory along with the expected potential for lucrative hydrocarbon and mineral resources therein. Accession will also secure the United States a strong position to shape and influence the region for the preservation of its vital interests.
2) In collaboration with Russia, develop and execute the regional search and rescue exercise
Operation ARCTIC LIGHT inclusive of all the Arctic nations. OAL will be a unifying catalyst among the Arctic nations promoting trust, cooperation, mutual understanding and will demonstrate the inherent benefits of capability synchronization in the region. The attendant organizational structure necessary to plan and propagate the exercise will provide the roadmap and foundational impetus for further regional partnership solidifying the gains hereto achieved.
3) Using SAR as the unifying point and building on existing multinational venues, lead the formalization of regional partnership into the Multinational Arctic Task Force. MNATF will be a cohesive and enduring organization that unites the Arctic nation's military forces and will complement political collaborations in the region. MNATF mission sets will expand from SAR to meet the emerging needs of safety and security at the northern most reaches of the planet.
Ultimately, the United States in particular, and the world at large will benefit from a stable and secure Arctic region.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the United States must become more involved in the preparation for an ice-free Arctic and in the leadership of the region's issues. In this expansive geographic region, the issues are equally as expansive and require multilateral solutions to multinational problems.
The recommendations mentioned herein are a foundational starting point for the United States to
